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BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR.*

The Trouble with Time: Influencing
the Conservation Choices of Future
Generations
ABSTRACT
Current generations dictate the conservation decisions of future
generationsin a variety of ways: they mandate land preservation
in state constitutions, establish parks and other reserves, and
create "perpetual" conservation easements. Because conditions,
preferences, and knowledge change over time, such
"intergenerational conservancies" may not always seem to be
wise decisions 50 or a hundred years after they are made. But
intergenerationalconservancies do not inescapably bind future
generations. The law provides various means, in particular,for
future generations to escape conservation easements that have
outlived their societal usefulness. There are various reasons,
moreover, why society should allow the creation of
intergenerationalconservancies. These include the need to reduce
the transaction costs of land conservation, to avoid future
temptation, to ensure effective private and public ordering,and to
solve a temporal tragedy of the commons. The law should be
careful not to require or encourage "perpetual" conservation
easements where shorter-term conservation easements would
benefit society more, but intergenerationalconservancies of all
types often can be exceptionally valuable to both current and
future generations.
Time complicates virtually everything, particularly environmental issues. Examples abound in the environmental field. The
"latency" of many environmental harms, for example, increases
uncertainty and raises questions whether and how policy makers should
discount future harms in deciding whether current regulations are
worthwhile. We often do not know whether a particular chemical is toxic
or whether the destruction of a particular habitat will lead to the
extinction of a species until after the harm occurs. The future benefits of
* Vice Dean and Robert E. Paradise Professor of Natural Resources Law, Stanford
Law School; Co-Director, Stanford Institute for the Environment; Senior Scholar (by
courtesy), Stanford Institute for International Studies. I am indebted to Meg Caldwell,
Andy Dana, and Graham Chisholm for valuable comments on an earlier draft of this
comment.
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banning the chemical or preserving the habitat, moreover, must be
balanced against current costs, requiring some metric for comparing
across time and across generations. Yet the choice of a metric is highly
contested, in part because it reflects judgments about intergenerational
equity.
At a more subtle level, the passage of time makes it difficult for
us to analyze and judge the causes and nature of environmental damage.
Each generation tends to view environmental problems within the space
of a few decades at best. When environmental degradation has been
relatively gradual over a lengthy period of time, the current generation
may not appreciate the full loss that has occurred and thus the
consequences of continued degradation. Declines in marine fisheries, for
example, look serious when viewed from the perspective of the last
several decades, but catastrophic when viewed from the vantage point of
the last century.' Each generation also tends to focus on current or recent
events when trying to explain environmental changes, even though the
culprit might have a much older origin. Faced by declining populations
of stellar sea lions, for example, environmentalists have focused on
current fishing and human predation, while the best explanation may2be
destructive whaling practices in the early- and mid-twentieth century.
Because humans have not yet found a way to bridge time, future
generations also cannot have a direct say about current resource uses
that inevitably will impact them. When resource decisions impact
members of the current generation, the affected parties have various
means of expressing their displeasure and trying to change the decisions.
When one region of the world imposes externalities on another, for
example, the second region can respond diplomatically, economically, or
even militarily. 3 In various international forums, resource-poor regions
4
also can challenge the distribution of resources among regions. Future
generations do not have that luxury, but must depend on representation
by foresighted members of the current generation. The current genera-

1. See Daniel Pauly, Anecdotes and the Shifting Baseline Syndrome of Fisheries,10 TRENDS
INECOLOGY & EVOLUTION 430 (1995).
2. See A.M. Springer et al., Sequential Megafauna Collapse in the North Pacific Ocean:An
Ongoing Legacy of Industrial Whaling?, 100 PROC. NATL ACADEMY SCI. 12,223 (2003).
3. Thus nations that share rivers or other waterways have had little difficulty
resolving current transnational disputes over the impact of upstream water use on downstream nations. See Aaron T. Wolf, Conflict and CooperationAlong InternationalWaterways, 1
WATER POLICY 251 (1998) (describing the resolution of international water disputes).
4. A number of international negotiations have dealt either explicitly or implicitly
with the current distribution of resources. See, e.g., DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY 760-61 (2d ed. 2002) (discussing dispute over allocation of
resources on the deep sea bed).
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tion can decide to consume all of the world's mineral resources, destroy
ecosystems that provide valuable natural services such as water
purification or pollination, contaminate ground water, and alter the
planet's climate path, yet future generations are powerless to do anything about it. Both the political and economic systems, moreover, are
structured, perhaps inevitably, in a fashion that is biased toward current
consumption. 5 The trend is to consume as much as possible, with little
thought for those who will come after us.
In both her provocative article on Perpetual Restrictions on Land
and the Problem of the Future6 and her paper for this conference, Professor
Julia Mahoney focuses on the related issue of the degree, if any, to which
the current generation should be able to dictate the environmental
practices of future generations. The current generation cannot use land
and other resources without affecting future generations; to this extent,
the actions of the current generation and the options of future
generations are inevitably intertwined. But as Professor Mahoney
astutely observes, the current generation can leave land undeveloped
today without dictating that future generations do the same. Should the
current generation go further and try to prevent future generations from
developing that land? Does the current generation have the right to do
so?
The issue that Professor Mahoney raises is of broad and growing
importance. Professor Mahoney focuses strictly on private conservation
easements purporting to be perpetual. However, current generations
have a variety of other measures at their disposal to impose land
conservation decisions on future generations. State constitutions provide
one of the most effective means of constraining the decisions of future
generations because they typically are more difficult to change than
statutes or private agreements. Thc constitutions of at least seven states
set aside and preserve lands in the form of "commons trusts." New York
took the lead in 1895 when it created the Adirondack forest preserve. 7 In
the last decade or so, a handful of other states have followed suit with
such efforts as the "Alabama Forever Wild Land Trust," the "Great
Outdoors Colorado Program," and the North Carolina "State Nature and
Historic Preserve." 8 A number of these constitutional provisions
5. See Douglas A. Kysar, Law, Environment, and Vision, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 675, 687-88
(2003) (criticizing failure of market to represent future generations' interests); Barton H.
Thompson, Jr., Environmental Policy and State Constitutions: The Potential Role of Substantive
Guidance,27 RUTGERs L.J. 863, 900-01 (1996) (discussing bias in the political process).
6. 88 VA. L. REV. 739 (2002).
7. N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 1.
8. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. amend. 543, § 3; COLO. CONST. art. XXVII, § 1; MASS. CONST.
art. XLIX; MICH. CONST. art. IX, § 35, art. X, § 5; N.C. CONST. art. XIV, § 5.
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expressly contemplate that the commons trusts will be perpetual. New
York's constitution, for example, explicitly states that the lands set aside,
or later acquired, for its Adirondack forest preserve "shall be forever kept
as wild."9
Federal, state, and local governments, too, actively try to protect
private lands from future development by acquiring the lands and then
awarding the lands special status as parks, wildlife refuges, wilderness
areas, or other forms of preserves. In the three decades from 1964 to
1994, for example, the four major land agencies of the federal government (Bureau of Land Management (BLM), U.S. Fish & Wildlife Service,
U.S. Forest Service, and National Park Service) purchased over five
million acres of private land. 10 The best estimate is that the government
acquired at least 3.7 million acres of this land for conservation
purposes." States and local governments also have played a significant
role in preserving land in the form of parks, preserves, or other public
lands.12
Turning to the private sector, land trusts and conservation
easements have assumed increasing importance. During the 1990s, the
number of land trusts increased by 42 percent (to over 1250 local,
regional, and national organizations as of 2000). 13 More importantly, the

amount of private land protected through the land trusts increased by
over 220 percent.' 4 In 1998, these nongovernmental organizations held
almost 1.7 million acres of land in fee simple absolute and over 2.3
million acres in conservation easements. 15 Through its tax laws,
moreover, the federal government encourages the creation of
"perpetual" conservation easements. To obtain a charitable deduction or
estate tax benefits, a property owner must convey a perpetual easement;
9. N.Y. CONST. art. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
10. U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, LAND OWNERSHIP: INFORMATION ON THE
ACREAGE, MANAGEMENT, AND USE OF FEDERAL AND OTHER LANDS 6 tbl. 1,12 tbl. 27 (1994).
11. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Conservation Options: Toward a GreaterPrivate Role, 21 VA.
ENVTL. L.J. 245, 270-71 (2002).
12. As of 1997, states had established over 12 million acres of state parks and recreation areas. U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1999, at 263 tbl.
429, available at http://w-ww.census.gov/prod/99pubs/99statab/secO7.pdf (last visited
Apr. 6, 2004). See also Chad P. Dawson & Pauline Thorndike, State-Designated Wilderness
Programs in the United States, INT'L J. OF WILDERNESS, Dec. 2002, at 21 (describing state
efforts to preserve lands with wilderness qualities), available at http://www.wilderness.
net/library/documents/Dawsonl.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2004); Peter S. Duncan, New York
State's Open Space Conservation Program, 4 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK 18 (1999) (discussing
New York efforts to preserve open space through parks and other mechanisms).
13. Land Trust Alliance, National Land Trust Census, at http://www.lta.org/newsroom
/census2000.htm (lastvisited Apr. 7,2004).
14. Id.
15. See Thompson, supranote 11, at 276-77.
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limited duration easements do not qualify. 16 Other programs of the
federal government also encourage the creation of perpetual
conservation easements. The Conservation Reserve Enhancement
Program (CREP), for example, pays farmers to establish perpetual
17
conservation easements in agricultural lands.
The current generation's efforts to control future environmental
behavior do not stop, moreover, with land preservation. Over a third of
the state constitutions, including all of the constitutions drafted since
1960, include general environmental mandates meant to control the
activities not only of the current generation but also of generations to
come. 18 Various of these constitutions, for example, require the
legislature to provide "clean and healthful" environments for their
populations, reclaim mining lands, protect wetlands, or "preserve the
environmental life support system." 19 Several impose similar
responsibilities on the citizens of the state.20 By questioning the efficacy
of "perpetual" land preservation, Professor Mahoney thus also implicitly
questions how closely constitutions should try to dictate the
environmental behavior of future generations, given that there are likely
to be significant changes in environmental norms, conditions, and
technology. Professor Mahoney, in short, raises an extremely important
issue that often has been ignored in the legal and policy literature.
My goal in this comment is to scrutinize and challenge Professor
Mahoney's analysis to see whether conservation easements and other
16. I.R.C. §§ 170, 2031(c) (2001). See Maureen Randolph & Adrian Gosch, A
Practitioner'sGuide to Drafting Conservation Easements and the Tax Implications, 4 GREAT
PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES J. 143,161-75 (2000).
17. See U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., FARM SERVICE AGENCY, CONSERVATION RESERVE
ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM (CREP), available at www.fsa.usda.gov/dafp/cepd/crep.htm
(last visited Apr. 7, 2004) (describing the CREP program).
18. For an overview and critical appraisal of such constitutional provisions, see
Thompson, supra note 5, at 867-77; Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Constitutionalizing the
Environment: The History and Futureof Montana's Environmental Provisions, 64 MONT. L. REV.
157 (2003).
19. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. II, § 7 (providing for the conservation and protection of
"natural resources and scenic beauty"); HAW. CONST. art. X1, § 9 ("Each person has the
right to a clean and healthful environment"); MICH. CONST. art. IV, § 52 ("legislature shall
provide for the protection of the air, water, and other natural resources of the state from
pollution, impairment, and destruction"); MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 1(3) (requiring
legislature to "provide adequate remedies for the protection of the environmental life
support system from degradation"); MONT. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (mandating reclamation of
all lands "disturbed by the taking of natural resources").
20. See, e.g., ILL. CONST. art. XI, § 1 ("the duty of each person is to provide and
maintain a healthful environment for the benefit of this and future generations"); MONT.
CONST. art. IX, § 1 (imposing a duty on each citizen to "maintain and improve a clean and
healthful environment").
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existing efforts to conserve land across generations (intergenerational
conservancies) are quite as troubling as she suggests. Professor Mahoney
certainly is correct that the perpetual conservation of any particular tract
of land can prove improvident as time passes-and that
environmentalists (as well as many politicians) often have ignored this
important issue. But as Professor Mahoney also recognizes, none of the
current efforts to protect land into the future is truly perpetual. As I
discuss in part II, by creating a "perpetual" conservation easement or
converting private land into a public park, the current generation shifts
the decision-making authority over future uses of the land from a single
private landowner to a land trust or to various segments or
representatives of the public. This shift makes it less likely that land will
be developed but still leaves the ultimate decision to future generations.
Professor Mahoney, moreover, does not address the legitimate
and important reasons why one generation might want to make future
development more difficult. Part III of this comment explores four of
those potential justifications. The critical question, which Professor
Mahoney does not reach, is how society should balance the potential
benefits of perpetual conservation easements and other intergenerational
conservancies against the possible costs to future adaptability. Are there
some situations, for example, where constricting future generations is
more legitimate than others? Could the degree of constriction be more
gradated than in current institutions? What degree of institutional
constriction is justified? I conclude in part IV with some brief thoughts
on these and other policy questions.
I. THE PROBLEMS WITH TEMPORAL COMMITMENTS

The problem with any temporal commitment, of course, is that
circumstances change. In deciding whether it is wise to make the
commitment, we try to predict the future, with varying degrees of
success. Uncertainty, and thus the risk of making the wrong decision,
increases as our decision horizon increases. Absent a good reason for
making commitments into the future, it always is best to leave these
decisions open until we have greater information. Where a commitment
lasts beyond one generation, moreover, there also is an equity concern
that the predictions of one generation will bind the actions of future
generations living in a quite different world with potentially quite
different values.
These concerns are as applicable to "perpetual" conservation
easements and other intergenerational conservancies, such as constitutional and statutory reserves, as they are to any other long-term
commitment. The value of land in its "natural" state might be very high
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today but much less valuable tomorrow. An example illustrates the
point. Sand dunes near Riverside, California, are home to the
endangered Delhi Sands flower-loving fly. 21 But sand dunes move, the
species may go extinct or be found to thrive elsewhere, and society
someday may decide that preserving this species is not as valuable as we
believe it is today. The value of developing a parcel of land also might
increase. As other land in the vicinity of Delhi sand dunes is developed,
demand may grow to build on the sand dunes themselves. Any decision
to preserve the sand dunes thus may seem wise today but improvident
(and even inequitable) ten, fifty, or a hundred years from now.
These concerns should worry environmentalists and the most
rabid of land developers alike. Recognizing that our knowledge of the
natural environment is limited and that ecosystems constantly are
changing, environmental scientists increasingly have called for adaptive
management of the environment. 22 And adaptive management requires
flexible institutions, not rigidly defined perpetual protections. In
working to restore a species, for example, biologists may learn that land
initially appearing to be valuable habitat is valueless, while other land is
more valuable than expected. Conditions also can change. Consider, for
example, the implications of climate change on efforts to preserve
biodiversity. The federal government's principal approach to protecting
biodiversity has been to create static preserves such as national wildlife
refuges or regional habitat conservation program-based reserves. 23 But as
climate changes, habitat also will shift, requiring the government
continually to refocus its preservation efforts geographically. Even if the
government could predict the shift in habitat, it would face the challenge
of protecting one land area today and a different area tomorrow. Rather
than preserving particular land in perpetuity, the government should
retain the option of exchanging land parcels (or selling existing preserves
and reinvesting the funds in new lands) as habitat moves.
II. SHIFTING ENTROPY
As Professor Mahoney recognizes, however, the notion of
"perpetual" land conservation is a bit of a canard. No matter how much
we might want to ensure that a piece of land is preserved forever, we
21.
22.

Travis Longcore, The Endangered Delhi Sand Dunes, 63 WESTERN TANAGER 1 (1997).
The foundational book in the movement toward adaptive management is KAI N.

LEE, COMPASS AND GYROSCOPE: INTEGRATING SCIENCE AND POLmCS FOR THE ENVIRONMENT

(1993).

23. Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Can the Endangered Species Act Protect the 'Working Landscape"?, in THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AT 30: LESSONs AND PROSPECTS (Frank Davis et al.
eds., forthcoming 2004).
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simply cannot do it. In its attempts to stop future generations from
developing land, the present generation is at a decisive disadvantage: it
will not be around to enforce its preferences. Nothing we say, whether in
conservation easements, trusts, statutes, or even constitutions, can force
future generations to defer to our view. We can make land worthless for
future development by, for example, irradiating it. But the only way to
avoid future development entirely is to damage the land to such a
degree that the land is not worth using, and that would thwart
preservation as effectively as it would preclude development.
The current generation, however, can increase the difficulty of
future development. At the most protective end of the spectrum, we can
constitutionalize land preservation as New York did a century ago with
the Adirondacks and other states are doing today. By design, state
constitutions generally are difficult to amend. To develop a portion of
the Adirondack forest preserve, for example, both houses of the New
York legislature would have to approve the idea in two consecutive
years, and a majority of state voters then would have to vote in favor of
the constitutional amendment. 24
Statutory preservation also is generally difficult to terminate.
Once the federal government creates a park, wildlife refuge, national
forest, or other conservation area, both houses of Congress typically
must vote to remove the protected status-a tough task given congressional inertia and the vested interests that often grow up around the
protected land. Not surprisingly, there are virtually no examples of
national parks or wildlife refuges that have been voted off the map.
Modification of public land holdings at the edges is somewhat easier.
Congress has authorized the U.S. Forest Service and the BLM, for
2
example, to exchange small parcels of land for land of equal value. 5
Congress, and sometimes the administering agency, also can decide to
26
permit some forms of commercial activity, such as mining. However,
27
exchanges are hobbled by process and subject to increasing scrutiny.
N.Y. CoNST. art. XIX, § 1.
25. See Ryan M. Beaudoin, Federal Ownership and Management of America's Public Lands
Through Land Exchanges, 4 GREAT PLAINS NAT. RESOURCES. J. 229 (2000); Melanie Tang,
SNPLMA, FLTFA, and the Future of Public Land Exchanges, 9 HASTINGS N.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. &
24.

POL'Y 55 (2002).

26. See Roger Flynn & Jeffrey C. Parsons, The Right to Say No: Federal Authority over
Hardrock Mining on Public Lands, 16 J. ENVTL. L. & LrImG. 249 (2001). Absent a statutory
exception, the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act prohibits surface mining
within national parks, wildlife refuges, and wilderness areas. 30 U.S.C. § 1272(e)(1) (2000).
Other forms of mining, however, are permitted on wildlife refuges if compatible with
wildlife needs. See Robert L. Glicksman, Pollution on the Federal Lands III: Regulation of Solid
and HazardousWaste Management, 13 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 77 n.74 (1994).
27. See Tang, supra note 25.
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And some commercial uses, such as real estate development, are totally
off the table.
Freeing land from a perpetual conservation easement, although
difficult, may be far easier to accomplish than changing a constitutional
conservancy or public park. The land trust itself can eliminate the
conservation easement in most states by transferring it to the holder of
the underlying fee interest and thus "merging" the instruments 28 or by
agreeing to release the owner of the fee simple from the easement. 29
Under federal tax laws, land trusts, like all tax-exempt organizations,
cannot confer "private benefits" on landowners without risking
monetary sanctions and even loss of tax-exempt status. 30 Accordingly,
land trusts cannot release a conservation easement that will provide
"more than incidental" economic value to the owner of the fee simple
without jeopardizing the land trust's tax-exempt status. Land trusts,
however, can and do amend, and in some cases release, conservation
easements for equivalent value where the land trust believes that the
amendment or release will increase or enhance public benefits. For
example, some land trusts have modified building restrictions specified
in an easement where the landowner agreed to place more land under
easement elsewhere or made a cash payment to compensate the "public"
for the loss of conservation rights. 31
Even if the land trust has no interest in giving up its easement,
the owner of the fee simple may be able to escape the easement's
restrictions on various legal grounds. The Uniform Conservation Easement Act explicitly provides that courts retain the power "to modify or
terminate a conservation easement in accordance with the principles of

28. See Jeffrey Tapick, Threats to the Continued Existence of Conservation Easements, 27
COLuM. J. ENVTL. L. 257, 280-82 (2002) (discussing the application of the doctrine of merger
to conservation easements).
29. See id. at 275-76 (noting that most state statutes permit holders of conservation
easements to release the easements, usually without having to require any compensation
for the easement or obtaining judicial permission); see also Melissa Waller Baldwin,
Conservation Easements: A Viable Tool for Land Preservation,32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 89, 120
(1997) (noting that land trusts can release easements but suggesting that this is bad policy
for the trusts). As discussed in part IV, infra, however, a few states restrict the ability of
land trusts to release conservation easements. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 184, § 32 (2004)
(conservation easements can be released only after public hearing and approval by
specified public officials); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-2,113 (release permissible only if the
easement's purpose is not "substantial"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:8B-6 (releases must be
approved by the State Commissioner of Environmental Protection).
30. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2000).
31. See Ren Wieser, Conservation Easement Amendments: Results from a Study of Land
Trusts, EXCHANGE, Spring 2000, at 9 (noting that four percent of conservation easements in
1999 had been amended).
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law and equity." 32 Courts, for example, may refuse to enforce a conservation easement if the fee owner can prove that changed circumstances
make the purposes of the easement impossible or impracticable to
accomplish. 33 The ease with which a property owner can successfully
assert changed circumstances will depend on the breadth of the
easement's purposes. Where the purpose of a conservation easement is
to preserve the habitat of an endangered species and either the species
has gone extinct or the property is no longer useful habitat, for example,
the doctrine of changed circumstances would seem particularly
applicable. 34 The doctrine would seem less relevant where a conservation
easement has broad and multiple purposes because, although some of
the purposes might become impracticable, others are likely to remain
achievable.
Courts that believe a conservation easement is no longer in the
public interest because of changes in public preferences, scientific
knowledge, or even land values might also turn to other doctrines to
eliminate the outdated restrictions. If the social value of developing the
property greatly exceeds the social value of the conservation easement,
for example, a court might refuse to enforce the easement under the
"relative hardship" doctrine, relegating the easement owner to seeking
damages. 35 A court determining that a conservation easement no longer
serves a valuable public function might also turn to a technical ground,
36
such as ambiguity or impossibility, to invalidate the easement. Finally,
a court might assert its power to reexamine old and questionable
conservation easements based on the general policies against enforcing
servitudes that violate public policy and against permitting the "dead
hand" of one generation to control the land use decisions of future

32. UNIFORM CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACr § 3(b) (1981), availableat http://www.law.
upenn.edu/bl/ulc/fnact99/1980s/ucea8l.pdf (last visited Apr. 7, 2004).
33. Id. § 3 cmt.; see Tapick, supra note 28, at 278-80; Baldwin, supra note 29, at 119-20.
The unique statutory nature of conservation easements, however, raises the possibility that
courts may refuse to apply the doctrine of changed circumstances (which historically
applied only to real covenants and equitable servitudes) to conservation easements. See
Tapick, supra note 28, at 279-80; Baldwin, supranote 29, at 120.
34. See Melissa K. Thompson & Jessica E. Jay, An Examination of Court Opinions on the
Enforcement and Defense of Conservation Easements and Other Conservation and Preservation
Tools: Themes and Approaches to Date, 78 DENV. U. L. REV. 373, 410 (2001) (suggesting that
conservation easements with narrow purposes are at greater risk of failing because of
changed circumstances).
35. See Gerald Korngold, Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy Analysis in the
Context of In Gross Real Covenants and Easements, 63 TEX. L. REV. 433, 486-89 (1984)
(discussing the applicability of the relative hardship doctrine to conservation easements).
36. See, e.g., Parkinson v. Bd. of Assessors of Medfield, 481 N.E.2d 491 (Mass. 1985)
(striking down conservation restriction on grounds of ambiguity).
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generations. 37 Given the common law's flexibility, in short, it is difficult
to imagine that courts would be powerless to free future generations
from conservation easements that no longer make sense.
Where a conservation easement has outlived its usefulness either
because conditions have changed or scientific knowledge has evolved,
the conservation easement also might legally die of neglect. In a number
of states, for example, marketable title acts might require land trusts to
re-record conservation easements periodically in order to keep the
easements effective. 38 Landowners who have violated the easement with
impunity for a period of time might also be able to claim estoppel against
any later effort to enforce the easement.39
Although there are often means of reversing conservation
easements and other forms of intergenerational conservancies, the
conservancy makes future development more difficult in two distinct
ways. First, all types of conservancies shift decision-making authority
from a single individual or entity (the property owner) to a larger group
(state voters, legislatures, a governmental agency, a conservation land
trust, or the judicial system). This requires the proponent of development
to convince more people, reflecting a broader set of public interests, that
developing a particular parcel of land is more valuable than continuing
to conserve the land. This, in turn, increases both the administrative costs
of development and the likely burden of proof.
Second, all types of intergenerational conservancies are likely to
increase the value that the public or land trust places on conserving the
land, as a result of both an endowment effect and social signaling. Under
standard endowment theory, the public (in the case of governmental
ownership) or a land trust (in the case of a conservation easement) is
likely to value conserved land more when it owns a conservation interest

37. See Tapick, supra note 28, at 281-82 (suggesting that the public policy against "dead
hand" control might be used to challenge a perpetual conservation easement that has
outlived its social usefulness); Korngold, supra note 35, at 494 (arguing that courts could
apply a public policy test to invalidate conservation easements that no longer are in the
public interest).
38. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47-33b (2004); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 57-59 (2003). Some
states' marketable title acts, however, explicitly preclude conservation easements. See, e.g.,
GA. CODE ANN. § 44-5-60(b)-(c) (2002). Several commentators also have suggested that
conservation easement enabling statutes may override the operation of marketable title
rules, although there is no legal support for this position. See, e.g., Baldwin, supranote 29, at
119; Andrew Dana & Michael Ramsey, Conservation Easements and the Common Law, 8 STAN.
ENVrL. L.J. 2, 21 n.92 (1989).
39. See Baldwin, supra note 29 (discussing applicability of estoppel to conservation
easements); Dana & Ramsey, supra note 38, at 36 (same).
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in the land than if the land were in purely private ownership. As a
result, the public or land trust is likely to demand more to allow the
land's development than it would have paid to preserve the land anew.
The very act of giving the land special public or legal conservation
status, moreover, signals the social importance of conservation 41and
thereby may increase individual preferences for preserving the land.
Is it troubling that intergenerational conservancies make land
development less likely? Under all of the intergenerational conservancies, future generations do control how they use the conserved land.
Each instrument shifts the locus of decision and increases the preference
for conservation, but each generation still can choose to develop any
land that it wishes. Assume, for example, that a century from now
developmental patterns make it economically very valuable to subdivide
a particular parcel of land restricted by a conservation easement held by
a local land trust. Given the conservation easement, the decision whether
to develop the land rests with the land trust, which could choose to
release the easement; courts, which could choose not to enforce the
easement; and the state legislature, which could choose to modify the
law to make it easier to override the easement or could exercise its right
of eminent domain to acquire the easement. These entities might be less
likely than the fee owner to choose development over continued
conservation for the reasons discussed, but the future generation still
retains decision-making authority.
Nor is it clear that the new decision-making parameters are
inferior a priori to the traditional single-landowner model. There is no
reason to favor the conservation preferences that exist before an
intergenerational conservancy is established over the conservation
preferences that result from the conservancy's endowment effect and
social signaling. Nor is there any value-neutral reason to favor indivigroup
dual decision making over group decision making, except that
42
costs.
transaction
increased
involves
typically
decision making

40. See Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L.
REV. 1551, 1566 (1998) (endowment effect revealed in case of national parks and other
recreational public lands).
41. For a discussion of the importance of norm development and social signaling to the
development of effective environmental policy, see generally Holly Doremus, Constitutive
Law and Environmental Policy, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 295 (2003).
42. We might well prefer some forms of group decision making over others, of course.
For example, political decision making might suffer from pathologies that would lead us to
not award legislatures with the authority to decide on the use of conserved lands. But that
does not necessarily call for the rejection of other forms of group ownership (e.g.,
ownership of conservation easements by land trusts).
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Yet transaction costs inevitably are high when dealing with land
conservation. Intergenerational conservancies simply shift who bears the
transaction costs. When land is in individual private ownership,
members of the public face significant transaction costs in trying to
43
conserve the land (largely because of free-rider and holdout problems).
Conversely, when land has been conserved through public or trust
ownership, developers face significant transaction costs in trying to
develop the land. Unless there is reason to believe that the transaction
costs are greater in one context or the other, the preferable form of
ownership depends on whether conservation or development is likely to
be the more valuable use of the land. If development is likely to be more
valuable, the single-landowner model minimizes the expected
transaction costs; if conservation is likely to be more valuable, group
ownership minimizes the expected transaction costs.
III. WHY BIND THE FUTURE?
There may be affirmative and legitimate reasons, moreover, why
someone might want to make future development difficult for both
themselves and others. Even if one concludes that the creation of
conservation easements
or other forms of intergenerational
conservancies strips future generations of the ability to make their own
conservation decisions, this "dead hand" problem must be weighed
against a number of potential justifications for "perpetual" conservation.
This section discusses four potential justifications that seem particularly
convincing or raise important issues. Although individual property
owners might try to create intergenerational conservancies for reasons
that arguably are illegitimate (e.g., a desire simply to dictate the moral
norms of future generations), there are strong rationales in many, if not
most, cases for moving beyond "at will" or short-term conservation and
adopting some form of intergenerational conservancy.
A. Reducing Transaction Costs
Part II already has suggested one possible justification for using
an intergenerational conservancy: minimization of transaction costs. As
noted, land conservation inevitably involves large transaction costs
because of its public-good character. Large numbers of people generally
benefit from land that is conserved for its aesthetic, recreational, historic,
43. Christopher S. Elmendorf, Ideas, Incentives, Gifts, and Governance: Toward
Conservation Stewardship of Private Land, in Culturaland Psychological Perspective,2003 U. ILL.
L. REv. 423, 428-31.
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or cultural values or for the ecosystem services that it generates. As is the
case of any public good, however, each beneficiary is tempted to free
ride off of others' efforts to preserve the land, undermining effective
collective action. The most realistic options for conserving the land lobbying the government to acquire and preserve the land or raising
money through a private land trust-are administratively costly.
If one expects that conservation will be the most valuable use of
a parcel of land for a lengthy and indefinite period of time, an
intergenerational conservancy is likely to minimize transaction costs. If a
new agreement has to be worked out every X years (in the case of fixedterm conservation instruments) or each time the land changes hands
through market transfers, wills, or intestate succession (in the case of
conservation agreements personal to the current owner), the transaction
costs would mount quickly. Although an intergenerational conservancy
makes it more costly to move the land back out of conservation, the low
probability that development will become in the public interest in the
future makes it less troubling than having to negotiate new conservation
agreements every time the land is transferred.
B. Avoiding Temptation
Like Odysseus and the Sirens, a property owner also may wish
to avoid the future temptation to make a quick and sizable profit by
developing her land. Imagine a farmer who owns several acres of
wetlands in the middle of a rural area. The farmer may believe that
preserving the wetlands in "perpetuity" will maximize the long-term
value of the wetlands to society as a whole, including the value of the
ecosystem services and aesthetic delight that the wetlands provide. The
farmer, however, does not trust herself to make the "right" decision if, 30
years from now when suburbs are encroaching, a developer approaches
the farmer to purchase the land for hundreds of millions of dollars in
hard cash. Nor does the farmer trust her heirs to make the "right"
decision if confronted by that same "big bucks" option or if forced to
raise money to pay estate taxes upon the farmer's death. In these
situations, the farmer fears that when "temptation knocks," she (or her
successors) will be "weak willed" and act largely if not entirely out of
self-interest. Because no developer is knocking on her door at the
moment, however, the farmer is willing to transfer a conservation
easement today to a local land trust.
While the farmer may think about the problem in common,
homespun terms, economic theory provides support for her concern. A
number of studies suggest that people often may engage in hyperbolic
(rather than exponential) discounting: not only do we discount future
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benefits, but we discount them more heavily as our time horizon grows
shorter. 44 In other words, we grow more impatient. Thus, we might
prefer $10 today over $11 tomorrow, but $11 ten years from now over
$10 nine years from now. Given such dynamic inconsistency,
landowners might well conclude that, even though land should be
conserved, they (or their successors) will not be able to resist short-term
personal gains or needs down the road. Better therefore to create an
intergenerational conservancy before impatience or greed rears its ugly
head.
Similar concerns may explain why states sometimes place
governmental land into constitutional land trusts, such as New York's
Adirondack forest preserve. Voters may fear that, even though particular
land should be preserved in the long run for its ecosystem services (e.g.,
the water quality value of the Adirondacks), recreational benefits, or
aesthetic beauty, the government will be tempted to sell off the land if
faced by an immediate budgetary need or heavy pressure from
politically powerful development interests. Voters may feel that the
short-term gains may be particularly tempting to the typical politician,
who thinks in the short-term framework of the next election. If this is a
fear, constitutionalizing the preservation of the land is an effective
solution. One of the major purposes of constitutions, after all, is
providing long-term rules (e.g., due process and freedom of speech) that
will help guide us through periods when the immediacy of other
concerns makes us less prudent (e.g., during wars or soon after terrorist
events).45
C. Private Ordering
As Professor Mahoney recognizes, property owners frequently
use "perpetual" servitudes as part of private land-use regimes-and for
good reason. To see their relevance to conservation, assume that you are
developing a new subdivision of summer homes along the northern
44. For valuable discussions of hyperbolic discounting, see David Laibson, Golden Eggs
and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. ECON. 443 (1997); George Loewenstein & Richard H.
Thaler, Intertemporal Choice, in RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOxES AND

ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 92 (1991). Whether hyperbolic discounting indeed occurs (or
is simply a reflection of some other phenomenon) is the subject of current debate. A
number of scholars recently have suggested that hyperbolic discounting might be the
genetic vestige of behavior that made far greater sense to our ancient ancestors than it does
to us today. For an interesting study of hyperbolic discounting in birds, see Leonard Green
& Joel Myerson, Exponential Versus Hyperbolic Discounting of Delayed Outcomes: Risk and
Waiting Times, 36 AM. ZOOLOGIST 496 (1996).
45. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); WILLIAM H.
REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME (2000).
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coast of California. You know that you can maximize the value of the
subdivision by setting aside much of the land as a "perpetual" wildlife
preserve, so that the buyers of your homes can sit in their hot tubs and
observe the deer and birds in their natural habitat. After all, beauty and
nature are values for which buyers will pay extra. Each of the
purchasers, however, will want to know that they are not buying a pig in
a poke, that the land indeed will be preserved for a long, long time, and
that the land will not be subject to the whims of their neighbors (who
they do not entirely trust). Like many developers before and after, the
coastal developer may find it profit-maximizing to deed a "perpetual"
conservation easement to a newly formed land trust or even to the local
government. 46 The motivation here is no different from the motivation
underlying scenic easements, park dedications, and subdivision CC&Rs
(covenants, conditions, and restrictions). If the conservation easement
were of only limited duration, home buyers (or their successors) would
have to renegotiate the easement in 50 or 100 years, at which time the
successor to the developer would have significant monopoly power
(given that the homes already would exist).
At a more general level, intergenerational conservancies can
promote land use planning by private developers, governmental
regulators, and environmentalists by providing both stability and
security. In deciding where to build, developers will find it valuable to
know that certain lands are part of an intergenerational conservancy
because neighboring lands will sell for a premium. In deciding whether
to permit Riverside County, California, to build a new hospital directly
on top of the sand dune habitat of an endangered species, both
environmentalists and governmental regulators will find it valuable to
know that other land in the area that provides valuable habitat for the
species is protected by an intergenerational conservancy. If this other
habitat is protected only for a limited time, environmentalists and
governmental regulators may hesitate to let the hospital build because,
after the hospital destroys the sand dunes on its property, the owners of
the other habitat might develop their lands some day as well. For this
reason, developers also might favor "perpetual" conservation of habitat,
increasing the chances that the government and environmental groups
will permit them to build on some areas of habitat in return for the
preservation of other areas of habitat through conservation easements.
Stability, in short, can be a virtue and not just a vice.
46. For examples of so-called "conservation subdivisions" and their advantages, see
UGA ALLIANCE FOR QUALITY GROwTH, LAND PRESERVATION TOOLs, available at http://out
reach.ecology.uga.edu/tools/slides-land-pres/land-pres-tools.ppt (last visited Apr. 8,
2004).
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D. A Temporal Tragedy of the Commons
There also may be some situations in which a landowner will not
preserve his land unless permitted to preserve it "perpetually." Assume
that a rancher owns a particularly beautiful valley that is rich in
biodiversity and Indian artifacts. Assume further that the rancher
believes that the valley should be preserved for centuries to come for the
enjoyment of everyone and that, based on everything we currently
know, the valley will be more valuable to society as open space than as
the site of a new subdivision. The rancher may be willing to tell
interested developers to take a hike (despite the obvious financial
advantage of selling the land and moving to the good life in Newport
Beach) if he can be assured that the land will remain preserved in
"perpetuity," but not if his "good for nothing" son or grandson can
sell
the land as soon as he dies. "Why," the rancher will say, "should I
sacrifice if my sacrifice will not do any permanent good?"
The problem that the rancher faces is akin to the tragedy of the
commons or prisoners' dilemma, 47 but looked at temporally rather than
spatially. To remove time from the analysis, assume that the rancher, his
son, his grandson, and several more generations are all currently alive
and that each owns a fraction of the valley. Assume also that a developer
wants to build in the valley and will offer more money to the first person
who sells his land than to later sellers. Finally, assume that, if anyone
develops the valley, the valley is effectively destroyed. All the
generations of ranchers might want to preserve the valley, but each,
nevertheless, will be tempted to sell his land to the developer before one
of his relatives sells and gets the most money. In deciding whether to
sell, the rancher thinks, "If I don't, my son probably will, so I might as
well sell and get the premium myself." Each generation evaluates the
decision in the same way and thus will sell out to the developer, even
though every generation might prefer to preserve the valley in its current
state. This is the traditional tragedy of the commons.
Now assume that the various generations own the valley
seriatim across time. Even if every generation would prefer to save the
valley, each generation will be tempted to sell out to a developer
because, if that generation does not sell, the next generation is likely to
do so. Each generation, in short, is likely to decide that, if the valley is
going to be destroyed anyway, he might as well be the one to benefit
financially. The coordination problem is worse, in fact, than in our
47. See ELINOR OSTROM ET AL., RULES, GAMES, AND COMMON-POOL REsouRcEs (1994)
(discussing the tragedy of the commons and its game theoretical equivalent, the prisoners'
dilemma).
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single-time-frame example because the different generations in this
second hypothetical cannot communicate effectively with each other.
This is a temporal tragedy of the commons.
Perpetual conservation easements are a solution to the temporal
tragedy of the commons. By entering into a perpetual conservation
easement, the current property owner is able to bind both himself and
future generations. As a result, the current property owner does not need
to worry that he will give up economic profit by refusing to develop his
land today only to find the land developed by the next generation or the
generation after that.
IV. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
In conclusion, I am slightly more sanguine than Professor
Mahoney about conservation easements and other forms of intergenerational conservancies. Although intergenerational conservancies
make it difficult for future landowners to develop their properties, future
generations still retain ultimate control over how land will be used or
conserved. A number of policy considerations, moreover, argue for
intergenerational conservancies in specific situations. But a number of
issues remain: Is current law and policy biased too much in favor of
intergenerational conservancies, and are we creating intergenerational
conservancies in the correct situations? In closing, therefore, let me
suggest specific categories of potential reforms that deserve fuller
discussion and consideration.
First, current laws may dictate or encourage "perpetual"
conservation easements even when there is no justification for perpetuity
and the parties to the easement prefer shorter-term easements. Although
some state laws allow term easements, for example, others either
mandate that conservation easements be perpetual or assume that the
easement is perpetual, absent language to the contrary. 48 As discussed
earlier, moreover, federal tax laws provide strong financial incentives for
perpetual easements but not for limited-term easements. Indeed, much
of the movement toward "perpetual" conservation easements that
Professor Mahoney criticizes undoubtedly stems from the existing
federal tax incentive. Although land trusts and others often prefer

48. See Tapick, supra note 28, at 274 n.66 (noting that four states -California, Colorado,
Florida, and Hawaii-mandate perpetual easements). Cf. ME. REV. STAT. tit. 33, § 477(3)
(authorizing term easements). The Uniform Conservation Easement Act and a number of
states provide that "a conservation easement is unlimited in duration unless the instrument
creating it otherwise provides." UNIFORM CONSERVATION EASEMENT AcT, supra note 32 at §
2(c).
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perpetual easements for the reasons discussed in part III, state and
federal laws should not outlaw or discourage term easements when
parties prefer the shorter commitment.
Second, state and federal laws may unnecessarily deter land
trusts and other easement holders from releasing or selling conservation
easements that are of diminished environmental benefit. As noted
earlier, land trusts may fear that the release or sale of a conservation
easement for development purposes could jeopardize their non-profit
tax status.49 A number of state laws also either prohibit releases of
conservation easements or place unique restrictions on such releases
(e.g., by requiring governmental approval).50 Eliminating these drags on
the release or sale of conservation easements that have outlived their
value would help address Professor Mahoney's concerns without
outlawing legitimate uses of intergenerational conservancies.
Third, courts and legislatures may want to develop new
doctrines for evaluating over time whether particular conservation
easements remain in the public interest and for eliminating those that are
not. As discussed in part II, state statutes and common law already
provide a variety of means for freeing property from problematic
conservation easements, but most of the existing law developed with
more traditional servitudes in mind. Perpetual conservation easements
raise unique issues, calling for doctrines that more finely and
appropriately balance the social importance of conservation, the need for
adaptive management as conditions and knowledge change, and the
legitimate interests of future generations.
Fourth, governments and land trusts should consider whether
new forms of intergenerational conservancies might enable long-term
conservation while providing greater flexibility for future generations.
Most existing intergenerational conservancies are designed to make it
difficult for future generations to develop conserved lands. Even
conservation easements, which are the easiest to modify, still place the
burden of terminating the easement on the future proponents of land
development. Other, more flexible instruments, however, are readily
imaginable that would respond to at least some of the arguments for
intergenerational conservancies while providing future generations with
greater flexibility. For example, a conservation easement might provide
for an original fixed term followed by an infinite number of renewal
terms; exercise of the renewal terms might or might not call for
additional compensation payments. Existing federal tax rules, which
49. See supra text accompanying note 30.
50. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 184, § 32; NEB. REV. STAT. § 762,113; N.J. STAT. §
13:8B-6.
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offer deductions only for "perpetual" conservation easements, again
pose an obstacle to the development of such new forms of conservation
easements and therefore should be revisited.
Finally, state and federal governments should reconsider what
lands should be protectable through "perpetual" conservation easements. At the moment, landowners can put virtually any land into a
conservation easement and gain a federal tax advantage to boot. Yet,
most of the major justifications for intergenerational conservancies
assume that the conserved land has significant public good characteristics. Assuming that private ordering can be achieved through other
means, state and federal governments should scrutinize the broader
public benefits of conserving a particular parcel of land before permitting the land to be tied up through a "perpetual" conservation easement
(thus making it more difficult to develop the land in the future) and
providing a federal tax advantage (at a cost to taxpayers).
"Perpetual" conservation easements, in summary, are not
inevitably problematic. Indeed, strong policy arguments justify many, if
not most, of the existing perpetual easements. But state and federal
governments need to reexamine how existing laws and policies dictate or
otherwise influence the choice between term and perpetual easements,
and both land trusts and governmental conservation agencies should
reconsider why and when to prefer perpetual over shorter-term
easements. Although we lack empirical information, the current portfolio
of conservation easements might suffer from an unjustifiable bias toward
perpetuity. The need to reexamine current policies, moreover, does not
stop with conservation easements. The same concerns with perpetual
conservation easements that inform Professor Mahoney's article also
raise questions regarding many of our current approaches toward parks
and constitutional land conservancies. Reform is warranted, but that
reform should reflect the important role that "perpetuity" has long
played and should play in all forms of intergenerational conservancies.

